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ABSTRACT. Commercial and geopolitical 
realities drive Central and East European 
(CEE) countries to reduce dependence on 
Russian gas imports and enhance securi-
ty of supply. While, in general, these coun-
tries are heavily dependent on Russian gas, 
they have different conditions, varying ap-
proaches towards dependence and securi-
ty of supply, and thus give differing energy 
policy answers. Diversification is a means 
of reducing dependence and enhancing se-
curity of supply. There are many types of 
diversification. To understand this com-
plexity and assess CEE countries, we have 
developed a scheme of different CEE diver-
sification options for Russian gas imports. 
In this article, we analyse these options and 
achievements for one specific country, Po-
land, which seeks a level of diversification 
that would enable ending Russian gas im-
ports. We find that since the January 2009 
Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has 
taken concrete action, and it has finally 
made huge progress in gas import source 
diversification. New pipeline and liquefied 
natural gas capacities could allow Poland 
to reach its goal, though the existing im-
port portfolio still lacks a supply contract 
for Norwegian gas imports to be supplied 
through the yet-to-be-built Danish–Polish 
Baltic Pipe. Without these amounts, Rus-
sian supplies could be necessary, or at least 
Russian molecule supplies. In contrast, do-
mestic gas production does not seem to 
provide a grounding for diversification. Al-
beit energy efficiency and conservation are 
significant opportunities, reducing total 
gas consumption is also not possible, main-
ly due to the movement away from coal. 
From this point of view, sectoral diver-
sification has limited real relevance, as it 
can only limit further gas demand growth. 
With the termination of large-quantity 
long-term Russian gas supplies, transit di-
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versification will also bear less importance. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether 
the termination of Russian (long-term) gas 
supplies will actually serve security of sup-
ply, as diversification alone does not inevi-
tably lead to achieving this goal.
KEY WORDS: Poland, Russia, Central 
and Eastern Europe, natural gas, security of 
gas supply, gas diversification
Introduction
The issue of gas imports tends to be 
very sensitive in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE). This sensitivity has even ris-
en in some respects since the January 
2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, as gas 
has acquired an increasingly bad image. 
Many aspects of both the commercial and 
geopolitical realities have worked against 
gas, though natural gas is the cleanest 
fossil fuel and a potential backup source 
for renewables (pointing to sustainabili-
ty among the three dimensions of gas se-
curity), while also both the EU and na-
tional governments have taken measures 
to increase the security of gas supply (re-
lating to its availability and affordability, 
i.e., the two other dimensions of gas se-
curity). In terms of commercial reality, it 
is worth mentioning the gas price com-
petitiveness problem between 2011 and 
2014 [Stern 2017, pp. 3–4], Gazprom’s 
discriminating monopoly pricing [Stern 
2015, p. 11], and Gazprom’s other practic-
es confirmed by the European Commis-
sion’s Directorate-General for Competi-
tion (DG COMP) [Antitrust: Commis-
sion Imposes Binding Obligations 2018]. 
The geopolitical reality is associated with 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 and al-
legations related to the notion of “energy/
gas weapon/diplomacy”. While, in gener-
al, CEE countries are heavily dependent 
on Russian gas supplies, they have differ-
ent conditions, varying approaches to-
wards security of supply and dependence, 
and thus provide differing energy policy 
answers. Diversification is a means of en-
hancing security of supply and decreas-
ing dependence. While diversification 
has become a buzzword in recent times, 
the concept requires some clarification, 
as there are many types of diversifica-
tion, and the degree of complexity of CEE 
choices is high. To understand this com-
plexity and assess CEE countries, we have 
developed a scheme of different CEE di-
versification options for Russian gas im-
ports (Figure 1), allowing for cross-coun-
try comparisons. In this article, we ana-
lyse the possible diversification options 
and achievements for one specific coun-
try, Poland, which has made a passion-
ate, if not obsessive, demand for diversi-
fication away from Russian gas, its dom-
inant import source. We argue that de-
cisions on gas diversification (and secu-
rity of supply) are the consequences of 
choices made from among different se-
curity of supply dimensions (i.e., avail-
ability, affordability and sustainability). 
These choices should be made on the ba-
sis of such influencing factors as the fol-
lowing: (1) the energy perspective (the 
energy market supply/demand and price 
conditions); (2) the institutional context 
(the role of the EU); and (3) the govern-
ment’s approach towards dependence and 
its perceptions and expectations of threat, 
as well as its relations with Russia. Per-
ceptions are very important when evalu-
ating dependence. Poland has historically 
had bad relations with Russia, and main-
tains a securitized energy agenda based 
on fears of problems with the availabil-
ity and affordability of Russian gas sup-
plies. Naturally, bilateral relations vary 
greatly from government to government. 
However, with Jarosław Kaczyński’s op-
position Law and Justice (PiS) party win-
ning the parliamentary elections in Octo-
ber 2015 (removing the ruling Civic Plat-
form, PO, from power), the level of an-
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ti-Russian sentiment has reached a level 
that has resulted in an energy policy aim-
ing to eliminate all Russian gas molecules 
from its economy. Poland argues that this 
is necessary on grounds of security of gas 
supply. Stern terms this ideological stand 
as “ideological physicality” [Jonathan 
Stern, email communication, March 15, 
2019]. On this agenda, a significant role is 
granted to the Polish state-owned gas sec-
tor enterprises – the natural gas transmis-
sion system operator (TSO) Gaz-System 
and Polish Gas and Oil Company PGNiG. 
The increasing politicization of the issue 
of Polish gas imports is also underlined 
by more intensive political cooperation 
on energy between the USA and Poland. 
Autumn 2018 saw a joint statement of the 
US and Polish presidents, a joint declara-
tion of the energy ministries concerning 
enhanced cooperation on energy secu-
rity and a memorandum of understand-
ing on a Polish–US strategic dialogue on 
energy1.
The article is structured as follows. 
Firstly, in Section 2, we present our diversi-
fication scheme, and then in Section 3, we 
apply it to Poland. Finally, Section 4 pro-
vides a summary and some conclusions.
Methodology
Basically, diversification can be domes-
tic or external. Possible domestic diversi-
fication options include increased internal 
gas production and reduced gas consump-
tion. However, reduced gas consumption 
can also be achieved as external diversifi-
cation. Other ways of external diversifica-
tion comprise gas import source diversifi-
cation and transit or route diversification. 
The aforementioned diversification op-
tions can be further broken down.
Domestic means of reducing gas de-
mand include energy efficiency, energy 
conservation and sectoral diversification 
on the basis of fuels or energy produced 
domestically. Increasing gas prices affects 
all three options. Energy efficiency refers 
to using technologies that require less en-
ergy to perform the same function (e.g., 
using LED light bulbs, home insulation), 
while energy conservation means chang-
ing behaviours in order to use less ener-
gy (e.g., turning the lights off when leaving 
the room) [Energy Efficiency and Conser-
vation 2018]. Sectoral diversification – also 
called fuel-mix, fuel-type or energy-source 
diversification – aims at reducing gas de-
mand in a different way. It supports efforts 
to move away from gas in the energy/elec-
tricity/heat balance. In the case of domes-
tic sectoral diversification, gas is substitut-
ed by domestically produced primary en-
ergy (e.g., domestic coal). In contrast, ex-
ternal sectoral diversification (i.e., sectoral 
diversification based on imported fuels or 
energy) not only involves the option of re-
placing gas with another imported primary 
energy (e.g., gas is substituted by imported 
coal or nuclear fuel), but also the possibili-
ty of imports of electricity, a secondary en-
ergy source, through which gas-powered 
electricity generation and thus gas con-
sumption could also be reduced. How-
ever, if seen in the context of diversifica-
tion away from Russia, then the sectoral 
diversification achievement is overshad-
owed by the fact that, for example, the coal 
imports are from Russia and the domestic 
nuclear power plant uses Russian technol-
ogy or nuclear fuel, and is set up with Rus-
sian participation.
One type of external diversification is 
gas import source diversification, which 
may be realized with or without geograph-
ical diversification. The former refers to 
1  We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention.
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other countries or regions and the lat-
ter to a more diverse contractual relation-
ship with the actual exporting country, i.e., 
Russia.
Geographical diversification can work 
not only without but also with Russian in-
volvement. Regarding geographical diver-
sification without Russian involvement, 
purchasing gas from a non-Russian sup-
plier can occur either through physical or 
contractual diversification. In the case of 
contractual diversification, as compared 
to physical diversification, under normal 
(i.e., non-emergency) conditions, typical-
ly gas of Russian origin is delivered, al-
though physical delivery from a non-Rus-
sian seller is in principle also possible. If 
Russian gas is not physically available, for 
Figure 1. Central and East European gas diversification scheme
Source: Own compilation, partly based on Balmaceda [Balmaceda 2008; Balmaceda 2013] and Stern [Stern 2002].
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example during a Russian–Ukrainian gas 
crisis, the contracted volumes will be de-
livered from other gas sources2. This high-
lights that Russian gas plays an even great-
er role in CEE.
Physical diversification can also be en-
sured with Russian involvement. In this 
case, the transaction is arranged through 
Russia, either in such a way that Russia 
serves simply as a transit country or Rus-
sia is involved in the transaction as more 
than a transit country. The first case can-
not work because no free transit is provid-
ed through Russia. Thus, CEE consumers 
are also unable to buy gas directly from 
Central Asia transited through Russia. Di-
rect supplies to Ukraine were stopped at 
the end of 2005. In order to purchase Cen-
tral Asian gas, transit diversification avoid-
ing Russia is necessary. The second case 
for physical diversification with Russian 
involvement includes two methods. One 
special method was used until the end of 
2008. Certain CEE countries bought gas 
from Central Asia through intermediary 
companies at a cheaper price than offered 
by Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas 
giant. This gas was transited through Rus-
sia, and Russians played different roles in 
the various available obscure ways of con-
ducting these transactions. For example, 
gas was delivered through the controver-
sial Russian–Ukrainian Rosukrenergo to 
Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Roma-
nia. The second method is still operation-
al and refers to re-exports through a whol-
ly-owned subsidiary of Gazprom. Gaz-
prom Schweiz AG (formerly ZMB Schweiz 
AG) re-exports Central Asian gas to CEE 
[Weiner 2016, p. 8]3.
Some sort of gas import source diver-
sification could also be achieved without 
geographical diversification, either with 
non-Gazprom Russian sellers or with 
Gazprom. The first option is quite limit-
ed, and restricted to Itera’s (former) activ-
ities in the Baltic states4. This is because, 
theoretically, buying piped gas from other 
Russian suppliers is not possible, as Gaz-
prom holds almost exclusive rights to ex-
port pipeline gas from Russia. Howev-
er, Gazprom’s almost exclusive rights to 
export liquefied natural gas (LNG) were 
partially revoked at the end of 20135. The 
second option for import source diversi-
fication without geographical diversifica-
tion is when Gazprom has various types 
of contracts, either with more than one 
importer in the particular CEE coun-
try or with one importer but for different 
time horizons (short-, medium- and long-
term). A few examples of the former can 
be found, but at most only one example of 
the latter is known in CEE6.
Finally, there is transit or route diver-
sification, which is generally supported by 
both CEE and Russia, but there are various 
views on how this should be implement-
ed. Possible transit diversification options 
include other Western CIS7 transit states 
2  The term “contractual diversification” is used similarly to Stern [Stern 2002], but differently from Balmaceda [Balmaceda 2008; 
Balmaceda 2013]. According to Balmaceda [Balmaceda 2008; Balmaceda 2013], contractual diversification refers to a variety of 
contractual relationships, either in terms of companies or types of contracts (short-term, long-term, etc.) without geographical 
diversification.
3  Naturally, it is impossible to distinguish between the gas molecules originating from Central Asia and those from Russia.
4  Russia’s independent gas producer Itera Oil and Gas Company was acquired by Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft from Itera 
Holdings Limited (Cyprus). On the role of Itera, see Weiner [Weiner 2016, p. 61].
5  In theory (!), LNG from Yamal LNG, a non-Gazprom project in Russia, might also reach CEE. (As an anonymous reviewer has noted, 
the majority ownership of Yamal LNG is held by Novatek, in which Gazprom has an ownership stake.)
6  However, this is not a perfect example. The major Hungarian contract, which was to expire in 2015 but was instead extended, has been 
divided. Thus, two contracts are effective until 2019 and two until 2021 [20 Years of Reliable Russian Gas Supplies to Panrusgas 2016].
7  The 12 non-Baltic former Soviet republics still tend to be referred to as the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), though, currently, it is a regional organisation consisting of only ten post-Soviet republics, since Georgia and Ukraine are not 
members of the CIS.
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and transit-avoidance undersea pipelines. 
Russia prefers diversification of its tran-
sit routes to Europe via undersea pipe-
lines bypassing Ukraine, mainly in order 
to reduce risks associated with Russian–
Ukrainian disputes.
Results and discussion
Poland is the seventh biggest gas con-
sumer in the EU, with 16.0 billion cubic 
metres (bcm) consumed in 20168. Gas pro-
duction amounted to 4.2 bcm, while im-
ports reached 13.9 bcm. Gas exports from 
Poland increased to 839.3 million cubic 
metres (mmcm) in 2016 [Report on the 
Results of Monitoring 2017, p. 29]. How-
ever, despite being a notable gas consum-
er, natural gas plays a minor role in Poland, 
though its share has grown over time. At 
end-2016, natural gas constituted 4 per 
cent of installed electricity generation ca-
pacity, whereas hard coal still accounted 
for 46 per cent, and lignite provided a fur-
ther 23 per cent [Szulc 2017]. In 2016, nat-
ural gas was responsible for 4.7 per cent of 
electricity generation, compared to 0.9 per 
cent in 2001 and 0.1 per cent in the ear-
ly 1990s. The share of solid fuels stood at 
78.2 per cent in 2016, whilst 14.0 per cent 
of electricity generation was from renew-
ables [Supply, Transformation and Con-
sumption of Electricity (1) 2018]. Similar-
ly, in 2016, natural gas provided only about 
7 per cent of derived heat production. Sol-
id fuels had more than 80 per cent, while 
less than 5 per cent of the generation of 
heat was from renewables [Supply, Trans-
formation and Consumption of Electricity 
(2) 2018]. On the other hand, household 
gas consumption from the gas supply sys-
tem constitutes roughly a quarter of Polish 
total gas consumption [Energy Manage-
ment and Gas Supply System 2018].
Poland is still highly dependent on 
Russian gas supplies, but this has been 
changing recently. In 2016, 74.3 per 
cent (10.3  bcm) of the total gas imports 
(13.9  bcm) came from Russia. Supplies 
from Germany and the Czech Repub-
lic represented 18.2 per cent (2.5 bcm) 
and 0.04 per cent (4.9  mmcm), respec-
tively. Due to the start of commercial 
LNG deliveries in June 2016, the share 
of gas from Qatar and Norway was 6.9 
per cent (963.6  mmcm) and 0.6 per cent 
(78.4 mmcm), accordingly [Report on the 
Results of Monitoring 2017, p. 29]9.
Poland was the first country to receive 
Soviet gas in the mid-1940s. After the 
change of the regime, in the 1990s, Rus-
sian gas supplies were initially arranged 
according to the Yamburg and Orenburg 
agreements. These were replaced by the 
1996 Yamal contract up to 2020 to supply 
Russian gas, which was related to the 1993 
intergovernmental agreement and 1995 
protocol to build the Polish section of the 
Yamal–Europe transit gas pipeline run-
ning from Russia to Germany across Bela-
rus and Poland. The Yamal–Europe pipe-
line was commissioned in 1999 (see be-
low). However, due to formerly overesti-
mated gas demand in Poland, the Yamal 
contract was modified in 2003. It was ex-
tended until 2022, while annual import 
volumes were reduced. In contrast, Poland 
significantly increased its gas imports from 
Russia in 2009, after the early 2009 remov-
al of the controversial Russian–Ukrainian 
intermediary company Rosukrenergo (al-
so, see below). That year, Poland was the 
only country to increase its imports from 
8  We do not have data in bcm for 2017. According to our calculations, gas consumption was close to 17 bcm in 2017 [Report on 
the Results of Monitoring 2018].
9  In 2017, the geographic distribution of imports was already somewhat different: 65.6 per cent – Russia, 22.5 per cent – Germany, 
10.0 per cent – Qatar (LNG), 0.7 per cent – the Czech Republic, 0.6 per cent – the USA (LNG), and 0.6 per cent – Norway (LNG) [Report 
on the Results of Monitoring 2018].
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Gazprom Export, Gazprom’s export arm, 
and – at that – significantly so10. In 2010, 
Poland was Gazprom Export’s fourth larg-
est customer outside the former Sovi-
et Union, ahead of France. While other 
countries worried about the excess gas vol-
umes contracted, Poland was trying to ad-
just its negative gas balance in 2009–2010. 
After a short-term contract in 2009, it was 
only in October 2010 that an annex to the 
Yamal contract was signed, allowing for an 
increase in gas purchases. With this step, 
Gazprom’s role in Poland’s gas supplies in-
creased. However, the contract was never 
actually renewed or extended until 2037 
[Weiner 2013, pp. 7, 18–19]. Furthermore, 
PGNiG has decided not to extend the 
Yamal contract with Gazprom when it ex-
pires in 2022. Poland is to replace Russian 
gas mainly with that of Norway via a yet-
to-be built pipeline and with LNG via the 
new LNG terminal.
High gas prices compared to Gazprom’s 
other European buyers have been the sub-
ject of continuous disputes in Poland. 
PGNiG claims that it pays one of the high-
est prices in Europe for Russian gas [El-
liott, Easton 2018]. In 2011, PGNiG turned 
to arbitration, while in 2012, PGNiG se-
cured a deal with Gazprom. Again, in 
2015, PGNiG filed a lawsuit against Gaz-
prom over gas prices, which resulted in a 
partial award in favour of PGNiG in 2018, 
but Gazprom applied to a Swedish court 
to challenge the ruling. Poland was one of 
the Central and East European EU mem-
ber states in which the European Commis-
sion investigated Gazprom’s anti-competi-
tive practices. It is broadly known that fol-
lowing inspections at the premises of con-
cerned gas companies in these selected 
states in 2011, DG COMP opened formal 
proceedings against Gazprom in 2012 and, 
finally, issued a Statement of Objections in 
2015. All of DG COMP’s three main find-
ings (preliminary view) referred to Po-
land. Firstly, DG COMP found that Gaz-
prom imposed territorial restrictions (ex-
port bans, destination clauses and other 
measures) preventing gas exports. Second-
ly, these restrictions could have resulted in 
higher gas prices and allowed Gazprom to 
pursue an unfair pricing policy. Thirdly, 
Gazprom might have been leveraging its 
dominant market position by making gas 
supplies conditional on obtaining unre-
lated commitments concerning gas trans-
port infrastructure. In Poland, gas supplies 
were made dependent on the acceptance 
of Gazprom reinforcing its control over 
the Yamal–Europe pipeline [Stern, Yafima-
va 2017, pp. 2–3]. In February 2017, Gaz-
prom proposed commitments to address 
the European Commission’s competition 
concerns, and in March 2017, the Euro-
pean Commission invited comments from 
all interested parties on these proposals. 
Finally, in May 2018, the European Com-
mission adopted a decision imposing a set 
of binding obligations on Gazprom [Anti-
trust/Cartel Cases 2018]. Firstly, Gazprom 
must remove restrictions on customers to 
re-sell gas cross-border. Secondly, Gaz-
prom has to facilitate gas flows to and from 
isolated markets by swaps, flexibility, as 
well as fixed and transparent service fees. 
Thirdly, Gazprom has to ensure competi-
tive gas prices, reflecting competitive West 
European price benchmarks. Fourthly, re-
garding the Yamal–Europe pipeline, the 
European Commission found that the sit-
uation could not be changed through such 
an antitrust procedure, as gas relations be-
tween Russia and Poland are determined 
by intergovernmental agreements. Moreo-
ver, a May 2015 decision by the Polish En-
ergy Regulatory Office did not confirm al-
legations that Gazprom would have fore-
10  Switzerland took roughly the same amount as in 2008 [Weiner 2013, p. 7].
8OUTLINES OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
closed the Polish gas market with regard to 
the Yamal–Europe pipeline, since its own-
er, Europolgaz, co-owned by Gazprom, 
was unable to delay or block investment 
on the pipeline (investment enabling re-
verse flows from Germany was also imple-
mented) [Antitrust: Commission Imposes 
Binding Obligations 2018].
In the early 2010s, many believed that 
increasing domestic gas production, a 
means of domestic diversification, would 
be a real opportunity for Poland. In CEE, 
only Romania has a substantial gas pro-
duction, but it is also not negligible in Po-
land. However, gas production in Poland 
is declining and approaching 4 billion cu-
bic metres per annum (bcma). It accounts 
for barely a quarter of the Polish gas con-
sumption [Report on the Results of Moni-
toring 2017, p. 29; Report on the Results of 
Monitoring 2018, p. 11]. Thus, the ratio of 
domestic gas production to consumption 
is also showing a decreasing trend as a re-
sult of the combination of declining pro-
duction and increasing consumption.
Shale gas was regarded as a genuine 
prospect in Poland, but the hype of the 
early 2010s has proved to be an illusion. 
At that time, the Polish government ex-
pected to start commercial production of 
shale gas in late 2014 or early 2015. In its 
Golden Rules Case or best-case scenar-
io, the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
predicted unconventional gas production 
in the EU would be led by Poland, start-
ing in the mid-2010s [Golden Rules for a 
Golden Age of Gas 2012]. Poland wanted 
PGNiG to double its gas production with 
both conventional and unconventional gas 
by 2019 [Poland Wants to Double 2012]. 
In September 2011, Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk believed Poland would basi-
cally be able to switch to using its own gas 
sources by 2035 [Poland to Start Commer-
cial Shale Gas Production 2011]. Howev-
er, so far all efforts have failed. Everything 
started with lower resource assessments 
than expected. By June 2017, concession 
holders had drilled 72 exploratory wells 
[Shale Gas Exploration Status 2017]. The 
geology showed the shale was not com-
mercial, leading the foreign companies 
to pull out of the market [Jonathan Stern, 
email communication, March 15, 2019]11. 
Regarding unconventional gas, the draft 
Polish Energy Policy until 2040, published 
in November 2018, expects progress on 
coalbed or coal seam methane12. It also 
assumes the use of biogas, particularly in 
combined heat and power generation [En-
ergy Policy of Poland 2018, p. 10]. Addi-
tionally, recent developments in conven-
tional natural gas exploration have posi-
tively impacted the domestic resource base 
[PGNiG: Breakthrough in Natural Gas Ex-
ploration 2018].
In Poland, there is room for reduc-
ing gas demand either through increas-
ing efficiency or without increasing effi-
ciency (energy conservation). Yet the sig-
nificance of these ways of introducing do-
mestic diversification tends to be under-
estimated. The 2017 National Energy Effi-
ciency Action Plan, adopted in early 2018, 
claims that according to the forecasts of 
the Polish Ministry of Energy – which 
are, in fact, the 2013 forecasts of the Pol-
ish National Energy Conservation Agency 
included in the draft Energy Policy until 
2050 – the Polish primary energy demand 
will remain stable at around 102–103 mil-
lion tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) per 
11  The difficult geological conditions were accompanied by regulatory challenges and lower oil prices. In 2010, Gény [Gény 2010] sug-
gested that Polish projects would not be cost competitive with imports over the following decade.
12  Still, the 2009 Polish Energy Policy until 2030 is in effect. The first version of the draft Polish Energy Policy until 2050 was published 
in August 2014, while the last version dates to August 2015. However, the document was subsequently withdrawn by the new PiS 
government [Energy Policies of IEA Countries 2017, p. 24].
9WEINER CS. DIVERSIFYING AWAY FROM RUSSIAN GAS: THE СASE OF POLAND
year until 2020, and then it is expected 
to decrease by about 15 per cent by 2050 
[National Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
2017]. At the same time, Poland’s indic-
ative national energy efficiency target for 
its primary energy demand in 2020, pur-
suant to the 2012 EU Energy Efficiency 
Directive aimed at helping the EU reach 
its 20 per cent energy efficiency target by 
2020, amounts to 96.4 mtoe. This would 
require achieving economic development 
without increasing primary energy con-
sumption (or with decreasing primary en-
ergy demand). In contrast, final energy 
consumption is well below 70 mtoe, while 
the national indicative target for 2020 
is 71.6  mtoe, which leaves room for in-
creases until 2020 [Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries 2017, pp. 47, 49].
In 2015, Poland’s energy intensity was 
16 per cent higher than Germany’s or the 
IEA European average13, but 6 per cent 
lower than that of Slovakia and 23 per cent 
lower than that of the Czech Republic [En-
ergy Policies of IEA Countries 2017, pp. 
47–48]. The Energy Policy until 2030 pre-
dicted a significant reduction in prima-
ry energy consumption per unit of GDP 
from around 89.4 tonne of oil equivalent 
(toe)/PLN million at 2007 prices in 2006 
to approximately 33.0 toe/PLN million at 
2007 prices in 2030. Consumption of elec-
tricity per GDP was expected to decline 
from 137.7 MWh/PLN million at 2007 
prices in 2006 to 60.6 MWh/PLN million 
at 2007 prices in 2030. To put these num-
bers into context, the Energy Policy un-
til 2030 declares that the energy efficien-
cy of the Polish economy will only reach 
the 2005 EU15 average at the very end 
of the forecasted period [Forecast of Fu-
el and Energy Demand 2009, p. 17]. Fore-
casts prepared by the Polish National En-
ergy Conservation Agency and presented 
as part of the draft Polish Energy Policy 
until 2050 indicate that the energy inten-
sity of the Polish economy will decrease by 
about two-thirds over the period 2010–
2050 [Conclusions from the Forecasting 
Analyses 2015].
In order to implement the 2012 EU 
Energy Efficiency Directive, Poland de-
cided to choose the standard programme 
of 1.5 per cent annual final energy sav-
ings (compared to the average final energy 
consumption in the period 2010–2012) by 
energy distributors or retail energy sales 
companies from 2014 to 2020 (i.e., a to-
tal of 10.5 per cent) [National Energy Ef-
ficiency Action Plan 2014]. In May 2016, 
the Polish Parliament adopted a new Ener-
gy Efficiency Act, which replaced the 2011 
Energy Efficiency Act. As of 2013, the 2011 
Energy Efficiency Act introduced a system 
of energy efficiency certificates, so-called 
White Certificates, imposed on compa-
nies selling electricity, natural gas or heat 
to end users in Poland. This scheme is the 
key energy efficiency support mechanism 
in Poland [National Energy Efficiency Ac-
tion Plan 2017]. However, there are many 
other ways of improving energy efficien-
cy. Wierzbowski et al. [Wierzbowski, Filipi-
ak, Lyzwa 2017, p. 60] mention the antici-
pated efficiency increase due to new high-
ly efficient power generating units replac-
ing older assets. It is also possible to reduce 
electricity grid losses, as current grid losses 
are above the EU average. In addition, im-
provements can be made to heat produc-
tion and distribution. Combined heat and 
power generation should gradually replace 
heating boiler technology. District heat-
ing modernization or replacement and 
the better insulation of homes would al-
so contribute to energy efficiency through 
the limitation of heat losses. Regarding 
this last aspect, up to 70 per cent of stand-
13  IEA Europe refers to the European member countries of the IEA.
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alone houses in Poland (around 3.6 mil-
lion) are insufficiently insulated [Nation-
al Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2017]. Fi-
nally, the popularity of low-energy build-
ings and household appliances should al-
so be increased [Wierzbowski, Filipiak, Ly-
zwa 2017, p. 60].
The diversification scheme indicates 
that a further option for reducing gas de-
mand lies in sectoral diversification, either 
domestic or external. Nonetheless, be-
cause of the low share of natural gas in the 
energy/electricity/heat mix, but also due 
to energy market perspectives and envi-
ronmental and climate directions, it is not 
a realistic goal to reduce gas consumption 
by sectoral diversification. Rather, it is on-
ly possible to limit the increase in gas de-
mand. In this sense, sectoral diversifica-
tion has limited relevance in Poland. Nat-
urally, substitution of gas with coal cannot 
be taken into account, since the opposite 
scenario might be the main factor leading 
to an increase in gas demand. For this rea-
son, among others, the intention exists to 
further raise the country’s gasification lev-
el. The growing presence of renewables in 
the grid also requires more gas, allowing 
for more flexible balancing. Some increase 
will also be seen due to the use of gas in 
transport. In contrast, the situation is dif-
ferent in the case of domestic and import-
ed biomass in electricity and heat produc-
tion, which can be considered forms of do-
mestic and external sectoral gas diversifi-
cation, respectively. Likewise, nuclear en-
ergy and growing electricity imports can 
also act as external sectoral gas diversifica-
tion. However, in all these cases, the ques-
tion is which energy source would be sub-
stituted. Poland used to be a net electricity 
exporter, but, for the first time in 2014, and 
then in 2016 and 2017 (but not in 2015), it 
imported more electricity than it exported 
[Supply, Transformation and Consump-
tion of Electricity (1) 2018]. Although the 
role of gas could witness an increase in 
electricity and heat production, it is ques-
tionable to what extent this will occur. The 
Polish Energy Policy until 2030 assumes 
that gas consumption will grow by 40 per 
cent from 14.5 bcm in 2006 to 17.1 bcm in 
2020 (this is close to the actual figure for 
2017) and 20.2 bcm in 2030, and the share 
of natural gas in net electricity produc-
tion will rise from 3.1 per cent in 2006 to a 
still very low 6.6 per cent in 2030 [Forecast 
of Fuel and Energy Demand 2009, p. 15]. 
In contrast, the 2013 forecasts of the Pol-
ish National Energy Conservation Agency, 
presented as part of the draft Energy Policy 
until 2050, show a smaller increase in gas 
demand for the period up to 2050 (from 
12.8 mtoe in 2010 to 15.2 mtoe in 2020 
and 2030 and 15.5 mtoe in 2050) [Conclu-
sions from the Forecasting Analyses 2015, 
p. 5]. Honoré [Honoré 2018] highlights that 
the role of renewables has increased much 
faster than that of gas in recent years, and 
believes that it is unlikely that natural gas 
will profit in the 2020s.
Geographical gas import source di-
versification implies both contractual re-
lations for sale and purchase and the con-
struction of the appropriate infrastructure. 
In Poland, a minimum level of diversifi-
cation is required by legislation. In 2000, 
the maximum share of imported gas from 
one country of origin relative to the total 
volume of imported gas was set for each 
year until 2020: 88 per cent in 2001–2002, 
78 per cent in 2003–2004, 72 per cent in 
2005–2009, 70 per cent in 2010–2014, 59 
per cent in 2015–2018 and 49 per cent in 
2019–2020 [Journal of Laws of 2000]. The 
regulation applied to all wholesalers buy-
ing gas from abroad. However, these re-
quirements raised doubts as to their com-
pliance with EU law. In 2017, a new reg-
ulation was published to specify the max-
imum percentage share of gas import-
ed from one country. Accordingly, it can-
not exceed 70 per cent in 2017–2022 and 
33 per cent in 2023–2026. The regulation 
contains a formula for calculating this 
share, and makes it possible for there to 
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1) Effective April 2016, the existing cross-border connections at Lasów, Gubin and Kamminke were replaced with a single point called 
GCP Gaz-System/Ontras (its capacity is 1.6 bcma).
2) The Yamal–Europe gas pipeline cross-border entry point.
3) The Yamal–Europe gas pipeline cross-border exit point and also entry point for physical and virtual reverse flows. There are some 
uncertainties about the volume of physical and virtual reverse flow capacity. A 2015 Gaz-System press release suggests that 8.2 bcma 
of virtual reverse flow capacity is available at Mallnow, including 5.5 bcma of firm capacity and 2.7 bcma of interruptible capacity [New 
Opportunities for Importing Natural Gas 2015], while data from the Energy Regulatory Office of Poland (URE) for 2017 indicate 6.1 bcma 
of firm capacity [Report on the Activities 2018, p. 148]. Nevertheless, for a selected day, Gaz-System’s Information Exchange System for 
available daily transmission capacity shows similar firm technical capacity to what URE presents above, but it also offers very high total 
daily interruptible capacity (almost double of the firm technical capacity) [Information Exchange System 2019].
4) Yamal–Europe gas pipeline exit points (located) in Poland. The aggregation of these two physical points is called Point of Intercon-
nection (PWP). Virtual (and also physical) reverse flow capacity can be limited by the PWP capacity [Peters 2018, p. 22], but currently this 
is not a constraint.
Note: According to our collected data, all the border crossings are indicated on the map (including pipelines of local significance; either 
for transmission or distribution). In parentheses, import capacity is indicated in bcma where data are available [Report on the Activities 
2018, pp. 147–148; New Integrated Annual Report Gaz-System Group 2018, pp. 24–25].
Source: Own compilation.
Blank map: http://www.youreuropemap.com/
Figure 2. Cross-border pipeline gas and LNG import capacity into Poland
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be exemptions from the obligation (e.g., 
for the LNG terminal in Świnoujście). It is 
notable that intra-EU purchases and sup-
plies originating from the states of the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
and Switzerland are not defined as imports 
[The Minimum Level of Diversification 
2017]. Until recently, Poland has mostly 
just talked about diversifying away from 
Russian gas supplies. Instead of costly in-
vestments in infrastructure and contrac-
tual relations, Poland has tended to em-
phasize solidarity as a means of conceal-
ing its own responsibility, while – as Bar-
tuška [Bartuška 2008, p. 57] has aptly for-
mulated – there can be no supply security 
without a willingness to pay for it. Howev-
er, the question is how and at what cost se-
curity is achieved.
Poland required not only new 
cross-border infrastructure but also sig-
nificant enhancement of its domestic pipe-
line network. Finally, in the 2010s, nota-
ble steps have been made to achieve di-
versification. Since 2016, Poland has been 
able to import non-Russian gas not only by 
pipeline but also as LNG. Via pipeline, Po-
land can buy gas from the east, west and 
south, but capacities are very limited at the 
southern and western borders. Some of the 
cross-border pipelines aim only to meet 
local needs and gas is not introduced in-
to the transmission grid. Poland can phys-
ically receive gas through the following 
channels:
(1)  from the east through Belarus 
(through two entry points from 
the Gazprom Transgaz Belarus net-
work and two exit points from the 
Yamal–Europe gas pipeline) and 
from/through Ukraine (through 
two entry points);
(2)  from the west from/through Ger-
many (through four entry points); 
and
(3)  from the south from/through the 
Czech Republic (through three en-
try points) (Figure 2).
Until the January 2009 Russian–Ukrai-
nian gas crisis, only one interconnection 
worth mentioning had been built to re-
ceive gas from the non-eastern direction. 
This German–Polish interconnection with 
an entry point at Lasów has been used to 
import gas from Germany (still ongoing) 
and Norway (in the past). Recently, Po-
land’s import possibilities from the non-
eastern directions have been increased 
due to (1) a new interconnector with the 
Czech Republic (called STORK); (2) vir-
tual reverse flow services on the Yamal–
Europe gas pipeline; (3) capacity expan-
sion at Lasów; and (4) the first LNG termi-
nal. Without taking into account the vir-
tual reverse flow service, more than 6 bc-
ma of capacity has been added. These three 
(No. 1, 3 and 4) provide a total of 7 bcma 
of cross-border entry capacity into Poland 
(Table 1), compared to the almost 17 bcm 
of gas demand in 2017. However, if virtual 
reverse flow is also added to the above ca-
pacity, total non-eastern cross-border ca-
pacity will be much higher. Therefore, it is 
worth comparing the sum of the latter ca-
pacity and domestic gas production with 
annual gas demand.
Further pipeline plans or projects in-
clude (1) the Baltic Pipe, an intercon-
nection between Denmark and Poland 
for transporting Norwegian gas; new (2) 
Polish–Ukrainian and (3) Polish–Czech 
(STORK II) interconnections; and the 
first (4) Polish–Slovakian and (5) Polish–
Lithuanian (GIPL) interconnections. The 
main geographical source diversification 
project aiming to end Russian gas im-
ports by 2022 is the Northern Gate pro-
ject that includes the Baltic Pipe and the 
LNG terminal in Świnoujście. While the 
LNG plan has finally been realised, the 
Baltic Pipe still has to be constructed. Al-
though the final investment decision was 
made in end-November 2018, and the 
project has strong Polish commitments, 
several issues still need to be elucidated. 
One such issue is the Norwegian resource 
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Table 1.  New cross-border pipeline gas and LNG import capacity in Poland since the 
January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis
Capacity (bcma) Year of putting into  operational
Pipeline gas
Czech–Polish interconnection (STORK) 0.5 2011
Virtual reverse flow service on the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline 8.2  (5.5 + 2.7)* 2011–2016
Capacity expansion of the German–Polish interconnection at Lasów 1.5  (from 0.9) 2012
LNG
LNG terminal in Świnoujście 5  (3.7 mtpa) 2016**
Mtpa – million tonnes per annum. 1 mt of LNG = 1.36 bcm of natural gas.
* See Note 3) for Figure 2.
** Commercial supplies.
Source: Own compilation based on data from Gaz-System.
base, which is to fill the 10 bcma capaci-
ty of the pipeline [Koblańska 2018; Elliott 
2018]. However, in addition to diversify-
ing away from Russian gas, there are two 
other main reasons for this project. First-
ly, it is related to Poland’s presence on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, with plans 
to produce 2.5 bcm of gas (compared to 
about 550 mmcm in 2017) [Borkowska 
2019]. Secondly, the pipeline might serve 
regional cooperation due to excess capac-
ity and surplus supplies. Poland may per-
haps become a gateway for gas supplies to 
neighbouring countries, such as Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and possibly Ukraine 
[Gawlikowska-Fyk, Godzimirski 2017, 
p. 5; Baltic Pipe 2018]. In January 2018, 
PGNiG signed 15-year gas transmission 
contracts for the Baltic Pipe for 2022–
2037. However, it has not made public 
how much of the pipeline’s capacity it has 
booked. Previously, PGNiG said it would 
book almost all of it [UPDATE 1-Poland’s 
PGNiG 2017]14.
Future LNG plans/projects include not 
only the expansion of the regasification ca-
pacity of the existing plant from 5 bcma to 
7.5 bcma15 and the construction of a sec-
ond quay (enabling trans-shipment, bun-
kering and developing inland waterway 
navigation), but also a floating storage and 
regasification unit (FSRU) in the Gdańsk 
Bay (Table 2). Only with the launch of the 
Baltic Pipe would Poland be able to im-
port 17 bcma of non-Russian gas, which is 
roughly equal to the 2017 gas demand. The 
virtual reverse flow on Yamal is added on 
top of the 17 bcma of capacity. Addition-
ally, even this would be supplemented by 
(some of) the above-mentioned projects. 
As of early 2019, among these seven plans/
projects, the Baltic Pipe and three other 
projects, the Polish–Slovakian and the Pol-
ish–Lithuanian interconnections, as well 
14  Stern claims that all capacity has been booked by PGNiG [Jonathan Stern, email communication, March 15, 2019].
15  The draft Polish Energy Policy until 2040 aims at extending the capacity to 10 bcma by 2030 [Energy Policy of Poland 2018, p. 24].
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as the LNG terminal expansion have final 
investment decisions.
The above projects have typically been 
supported by, or eligible for financial sup-
port from, the EU (e.g., as part of the Eu-
ropean Energy Program for Recovery, the 
Connecting Europe Facility or other types 
of EU financial support). Further, both the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) provided a loan to 
the Polish LNG terminal. Different types 
of financial support mechanisms also con-
stitute an important part of the (EU) insti-
tutional context.
Nonetheless, as Stern argues, the 
problem is that interconnectors allow 
gas importers to get hold of non-Russian 
gas, while the question appears wheth-
er non-Russian gas will even be available 
(interview with Jonathan Stern in [Simon 
2018]). Poland has been supplied by Ger-
many and the Czech Republic since the 
1990s16. The 1990s saw a stream of diver-
sification announcements about bring-
ing pipeline gas from Netherlands, Nor-
way and Denmark. But despite nego-
tiations and even at times signed con-
tracts, only a small contract was imple-
mented with Norway on the supply of a 
mere 0.5 bcma of gas for the period be-
tween 2000 and 2006 [Stern 2005, p. 116]. 
Russian gas was cheaper than Norwegian 
[PGNiG Signs Framework Deal 2006]. 
In 2018, PGNiG claimed that the cost of 
Norwegian gas would not be higher than 
the gas sold to Poland by Gazprom [El-
liott, Easton 2018]. However, this expec-
tation is difficult to meet. Rather, Poland 
will probably pay a very high price for 
Table 2.  Plans/projects to increase cross-border pipeline gas and LNG import capacity in 
Poland
Entry capacity 
(bcma)
Exit capacity 
(bcma) Status
Year of 
expected 
commissioning
Pipeline gas
Polish–Ukrainian interconnection 5 5 non-FID 2022
Polish–Czech interconnection II (STORK II) 6.5 5 non-FID 2022
Polish–Slovakian interconnection 5.7 4.7 FID 2021
Polish–Lithuanian interconnection (GIPL) 1.7 2.4 FID 2021
Baltic Pipe (Danish–Polish interconnection) 10 3 FID 2022
LNG
Expansion of the regasification capacity 
of LNG terminal in Świnoujście
7.5  
(10*) FID (non-FID) 2022 (2030*)
FSRU LNG in the Gdańsk Bay 4.1–8.1 non-FID 2021
FID – final investment decision.
* According to the draft Polish Energy Policy until 2040 [Energy Policy of Poland 2018, p. 24].
Source: Own compilation based on data from Gaz-System.
16  Import diversification is reflected as German (since 1993) and Czech imports (since 2012) in the IEA and Eurostat statistics 
[Weiner 2016, pp. 17–18].
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Norwegian gas, partly because Norway 
is aware that Poland has no alternative to 
importing through the Baltic Pipe, and 
also partly because of the very expensive 
new infrastructure. Therefore, accord-
ing to Stern, the obvious solution would 
be not to build the Baltic Pipe and simply 
to import gas through the Dutch/German 
network, but that would mean no guar-
antee that they would not actually be re-
ceiving Russian molecules, which would 
be against “ideological physicality” [Jona-
than Stern, email communication, March 
15, 2019].
As noted, Poland began receiving 
commercial LNG deliveries in June 2016. 
PGNiG has five long-term and one mid-
term LNG supply contracts and it also 
buys gas on the spot market17:
–  A long-term contract with Qatar’s 
Qatargas was signed in 2009 for the 
supply of 1 mtpa of LNG for 20 years 
to be delivered as of 2014. The con-
tract was amended in 2014 and 2015 
to divert LNG supplies destined for 
Poland to other clients in 2015 and 
the first half of 2016 because of delays 
in the LNG facility’s operation start-
up time. However, in 2017, an agree-
ment was reached to double volumes 
to 2 mtpa.
–  In November 2017, a mid-term LNG 
supply contract was signed with the 
UK-based Centrica to receive nine 
LNG shipments which were to be 
sourced from the US Sabine Pass 
LNG Terminal between 2018 and 
2022.
–  In October 2018, long-term contracts 
were signed with two subsidiaries of 
Venture Global LNG, Venture Glob-
al Calcasieu Pass and Venture Glob-
al Plaquemines LNG, each for the 
purchase of 1 mtpa of LNG from the 
USA over 20 years. The initiation of 
the commercial operation of the two 
US LNG facilities from which the gas 
is to be supplied is expected in 2022 
and 2023, respectively.
–  In November 2018, a long-term con-
tract was signed with Cheniere Mar-
keting International for LNG supplies 
from the USA, with a total volume of 
0.52 mt between 2019 and 2022, and 
29 mt between 2023 and 2042. Start-
ing from 2023, PGNiG will purchase 
about 1.45 mtpa of LNG.
–  In December 2018, another 20-year 
contract was concluded for the pur-
chase of 2 mtpa of LNG from US Port 
Arthur LNG, a Sempra Energy sub-
sidiary, scheduled to start flowing in 
2023 from an LNG facility currently 
in development.
Consequently, until 2018, the LNG 
portfolio consisted of long-term LNG sup-
plies from Qatargas, mid-term LNG sup-
plies from Centrica and spot purchases 
from Norway, the USA and Qatar. As of 
2019, this will be supplemented by long-
term LNG supplies from Cheniere. Long-
term LNG deliveries from the two Ven-
ture Global LNG subsidiaries would en-
ter the portfolio in 2022 and 2023, re-
spectively, while Port Arthur LNG would 
be added in 2023. PGNiG data suggest 
that LNG purchases would equal around 
3.5  bcm of natural gas following regasi-
fication in 2022, around 8 bcm in 2023, 
and roughly 10.5 bcma from 2024. Such 
LNG amounts cannot not be regasified, as 
the regasification capacity of the LNG fa-
cility will be expanded to only 7.5 bcma 
by 2022, and 10 bcma capacity might be 
reached only by 2030. However, PGNiG 
does not intend to unload such quantities 
either. The contracts with Qatargas, Cen-
trica and Cheniere as well as the spot deliv-
eries are on a delivered ex-ship (DES) ba-
17  All the following contractual data are derived from PGNiG’s website.
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sis, while the contracts with Venture Glob-
al Calcasieu Pass, Venture Global Plaque-
mines LNG and Port Arthur LNG should 
be carried out under free-on-board (FOB) 
terms. This means that whereas DES de-
liveries are dedicated to the Polish market, 
the FOB formula gives the opportunity for 
trade, which PGNiG will enact [Fiftieth 
LNG Cargo Arriving to Poland 2019].
Yet, as emphasized, availability is on-
ly one dimension of security of supply. 
There are serious questions about the price 
or affordability dimension of LNG sup-
plies. “PGNiG agreed a contract with Qa-
tar for one of the highest prices seen in any 
gas contract anywhere in the world” [Jon-
athan Stern, email communication, Jan-
uary 14, 2013]. A 2009 source stated that 
LNG supplies from Qatar might be 30-50 
per cent more expensive than Russian gas 
[Gas Firm PGNiG Has Contract 2009], 
while another source from 2013, with pre-
cise numbers, suggested more than 50 per 
cent higher prices [Vukmanovic, Bartecz-
ko 2013]. However, low(er) oil prices ex-
perienced since the mid-2010s have con-
tributed to a decrease in Qatari LNG pric-
es. In 2015, a Polish expert even went as far 
as saying that Qatari LNG could be com-
petitive when comparing with Russian gas 
import prices [Denková 2015]. Similar-
ly, price-competitiveness problems are al-
so encountered in US LNG imports due 
to opportunities to sell US LNG at high-
er prices in other markets outside Europe 
[Koblańska 2018]. Nevertheless, PGNiG 
has argued that the contract with Cheniere 
would most probably be over 20 per cent 
cheaper than pipeline gas from Russia [El-
liott, Easton 2018]. The problem is that we 
do not know how this figure should be in-
terpreted.
A further important problem regard-
ing affordability is the lack of a competi-
tive gas market in Poland because of the 
dominant market player belonging to the 
state, PGNiG. For competitive gas prices, 
Poland has to allow for many sellers and 
buyers, i.e., to open its gas market to com-
petition (interview with Jonathan Stern 
in [Koblańska 2018]). Peters [Peters 2018] 
claims that like the Czech Republic, Po-
land could achieve price convergence with 
the North-West European traded mar-
kets, but instead it maintains barriers to 
free cross-border trade and free trade at 
the Polish wholesale market (the Polish 
gas hub, the Virtual Point Gaz-System or 
VPGS). In such a situation, security will 
come at a very high cost [Jonathan Stern, 
email communication, March 15, 2019]. 
Therefore, based on the current cross-bor-
der capacities and the benefits of integrat-
ed traded markets, Peters [Peters 2018], in 
agreement with Stern, questions the com-
mercial sense of both the Baltic Pipe and 
the LNG terminal expansion. Using vir-
tual reverse flow capacity on Yamal–Eu-
rope and adding capacity at interconnec-
tions can be achieved at a fraction of the 
cost [Jonathan Stern, email communica-
tion, April 3, 2019].
A certain type of diversification was 
achieved from the east by introducing gas 
imports from Ukraine’s Naftogaz and from 
Central Asia through intermediary com-
panies. Naftogaz was selling a very small 
quantity of gas to satisfy local needs under 
a long-term gas supply contract, signed in 
2004 for the period until 2020, but Ukraine 
permanently suspended deliveries in 2010. 
Intermediary companies first included Eu-
ral Trans Gas, which was registered and 
operated in Hungary as an offshore busi-
ness entity, and then the Swiss-based Rus-
sian–Ukrainian Rosukrenergo, which 
functioned until end-200818. Contrary to 
the listed intermediaries, Gazprom’s Gaz-
18  In fact, these were trilateral contracts. PGNiG, Naftogaz and Eural signed a contract in October 2003, while the contract 
between PGNiG, Naftogaz and Rosukrenergo was concluded in February 2005.
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prom Schweiz, which re-exports Central 
Asian gas to CEE, is not present in Poland.
The final type of diversification is tran-
sit or route diversification. As indicated, 
Poland imports its Russian gas via diver-
sified import routes. Poland would have 
had the possibility of further diversifying 
its transit options through the trans-Bal-
tic Sea Nord Stream gas pipeline (between 
Russia and Germany) but it did not ask for 
that opportunity. The German government 
invited Poland to the Nord Stream project, 
but Warsaw refused. Wingas – then a Rus-
sian–German joint venture, now a whol-
ly owned subsidiary of Gazprom – also 
offered to link the Polish gas grid to the 
OPAL gas pipeline, a European onshore 
connecting pipeline of Nord Stream, but 
Poland did not accept [Cameron 2007, 
p. 3]. Poland has shown strong opposition 
to Nord Stream. It argued unsuccessful-
ly in favour of other plans, and projected 
catastrophic consequences. Likewise, Po-
land has also tried to block Nord Stream 
2. Instead of building Nord Stream, Po-
land first supported Yamal–Europe 2 and 
then the idea of the Amber pipeline, with 
the latter planned as crossing EU coun-
tries, from Russia through Latvia, Lithu-
ania and Poland to Germany19. Howev-
er, Russia’s goal was to circumvent (unre-
liable) transit states. Above all, Poland at-
tacked Nord Stream on the grounds of 
its environmental consequences (a po-
tential ecological disaster) [EP Rappor-
teur 2008]. Former Polish Defence Minis-
ter Radek Sikorski and others complained 
that Germany had not consulted with Po-
land before the decision was made on the 
pipeline, and considered the project to be 
President Putin’s most outrageous attempt 
to divide the EU leading to economic and 
geopolitical disaster. They regarded Nord 
Stream as economically absurd, referring 
to the costs of constructing and financing 
the pipeline, future tariffs and Gazprom’s 
growing dominance [Cameron 2007, p. 3]. 
They feared that with the construction of 
Nord Stream, Gazprom would turn off the 
gas tap to Poland without violating West 
European (German) interests. Fears were 
also expressed not only because of Po-
land becoming more vulnerable to black-
mailing, but also due to a potential transit 
revenue drop20. While Gazprom’s growing 
dominance could be a problem, and Nord 
Stream 2 could bring further negative con-
sequences, the above accusations have so 
far not been confirmed.
Gas transit via Ukraine will continue to 
be necessary in sizeable volumes until Nord 
Stream 2 and the trans-Black Sea Turk-
Stream (between Russia and Turkey) are 
launched. However, thanks to Nord Stream 
2 and its European onshore connecting 
pipeline EUGAL, gas transit via the Ukrain-
ian–Slovakian cross-border point is expect-
ed to fall considerably, while gas transit via 
Poland through the Yamal–Europe pipeline 
is likely to continue. On the other hand, the 
launch of TurkStream’s first line will result 
in a substantial decline in gas transit via the 
Ukrainian–Romanian cross-border point 
due to the diversion of gas destined for Tur-
key to the Black Sea corridor away from 
Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Nonetheless, even though Ukraine will per-
form a smaller role, it will not be completely 
eliminated and it will remain an important 
player. The major issue is the commercial 
viability of maintaining a large gas trans-
mission system with multiple exit points for 
19  Previously, another plan was called Amber, a joint plan involving Poland’s PGNiG, Denmark’s DONG (now Ørsted) and Lithu-
ania’s Lietuvos Dujos (later merged into Lithuania’s Energijos Skirstymo Operatorius), which would have delivered gas to Lithu-
ania through Poland. However, other plans also exist that have been referred to as Amber.
20  In January 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to assure Poland that Russia would not reduce transit through 
Poland [Nord Stream Will not Reduce 2008].
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the delivery of relatively small annual vol-
umes [Sharples 2018]. Currently, the major-
ity of the spare capacity for Russian piped 
gas exports to Europe comes via Ukraine, 
and, as Henderson and Sharples [Henderson, 
Sharples 2018, p. 26] argue, the EU wants 
to protect the Ukrainian transit route not 
only for commercial but also for political 
reasons.
Summary and conclusions
The issue of gas is very sensitive in Po-
land, despite the small share of gas in the 
energy/electricity/heat mix. This sensitiv-
ity is derived from Russia’s dominant role 
in gas imports, the still insufficient level 
of geographical diversification, and per-
ceptions of Russia as a security risk. These 
geopolitical considerations have a cru-
cial role in determining the Polish ener-
gy policy. Since the January 2009 Russian–
Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken ac-
tion to diversify its gas supplies, and af-
ter many years of only speaking about di-
versification and solidarity, it has finally 
achieved results. 
Whilst gas import source diversifica-
tion has made huge progress, increasing 
domestic gas production and reducing to-
tal gas demand cannot be added to the di-
versification results. Domestic natural gas 
production seems not to provide a ground-
ing for diversification, despite recent explo-
ration results. Shale gas expectations have 
not been met. With shale gas, Poland aimed 
to eliminate dependence on Gazprom. Cli-
mate incentives (i.e., the need to replace 
coal) were not considered. After this op-
tion was discarded, there is some hope for 
coalbed methane, also an unconvention-
al gas. In addition, biogas (biomethane) is 
supposed to play some role. Regarding re-
duced gas demand, albeit energy efficien-
cy and energy conservation are significant 
opportunities, total gas consumption will 
increase mainly because of the movement 
away from coal. Similarly, sectoral diversi-
fication can only limit further gas demand 
growth. On the other hand, gas will be in-
creasingly utilised as a flexible backup for 
renewable electricity and a certain increase 
is also expected in the use of gas in trans-
port. Here, geopolitical factors again come 
into play when Poland raises fears of for-
eign technological reliance regarding re-
newables production [Heinrich, Kusznir, 
Lis, Pleines, Smith Stegen, Szulecki 2016, 
p.  2] and Russia could not be assigned a 
role in the case of nuclear energy.
Geopolitical aspects would lead Po-
land towards not prolonging its long-term 
gas supply contract with Russia. This de-
cision comes in spite of the facts that (1) 
Russian gas is and will remain very impor-
tant to Europe, (2) the role of gas is ex-
pected to increase in Poland, and (3) the 
institutional context given by the EU (the 
Third Energy Package, the antitrust pro-
cedure and other measures) increase se-
curity of supply through both the avail-
ability and affordability dimensions. Inev-
itably, new pipeline and LNG capacities, 
as well as further capacities planned to be 
commissioned by 2021 and 2022, could 
allow Poland to reach import source di-
versification and to import large amounts 
of non-Russian gas. Efforts are also under 
way to expand domestic gas pipelines and 
storage facilities, as the domestic network 
needs to be prepared for non-eastern im-
ports. Recently, piped gas supplies from 
Germany and the Czech Republic have 
been supplemented with a large portfolio 
of LNG supplies, and Polish upstream ac-
tivity abroad will be added to these sup-
ply sources. However, this portfolio still 
lacks a supply contract for Norwegian gas 
imports to be supplied through the Bal-
tic Pipe. It is expected that sooner or lat-
er there will be (a) supply contract(s), but 
price can be a weak point in these nego-
tiations. Without these amounts, Rus-
sian supplies could be necessary, though 
gas traded at European hubs will also be 
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available, possibly also with Russian mol-
ecules, and surely with such in the case of 
using virtual reverse flow through Yamal–
Europe. Further, there could be difficulties 
with keeping the deadlines of the various 
diversification projects. However, the end 
of Russian long-term contract gas does not 
mean the definite end of Russian gas pur-
chases, but the bargaining position could 
be worse when contracting for shorter 
terms and smaller amounts. The question 
arises whether the termination of Russian 
long-term gas supplies and even the elim-
ination of all Russian gas molecules would 
really serve security of supply, as diversi-
fication alone does not inevitably lead to 
achieving this goal. The answer depends 
on the actual prioritisation of different di-
mensions of security of supply, taking in-
to account various influencing factors. Po-
land has chosen potential higher gas pric-
es backed by a solid availability dimen-
sion against the suspected high risk relat-
ed to the availability and affordability of 
Russian gas supplies. Besides the energy 
perspective, the institutional context giv-
en by the EU and the geopolitical factor 
play very important roles among the in-
fluencing factors. In the past, energy mar-
ket factors proved to be stronger, primar-
ily due to prioritizing the affordability di-
mension, but recently, signs of a shift have 
started to appear due to “ideological phys-
icality”. However, the overemphasised role 
of the geopolitical factor may lead to sub-
optimal energy policy decisions. Poland 
likely could have achieved security of gas 
supply at least cost if it had accepted Eu-
ropean traded market developments and 
had ignored where the molecules of gas 
originate from.
Finally, with the termination of large-
quantity long-term Russian gas supplies, 
transit diversification will bear little rele-
vance in the case of Poland. However, non-
eastern cross-border pipeline capacities, 
either old or new, might also provide di-
versification to importing Russian gas, as 
opposed to questions regarding long-term 
import possibilities through the Ukraini-
an corridor.
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